On the Incomparability of Cache Algorithms in Terms of Timing Leakage by Cañones, Pablo et al.
Logical Methods in Computer Science
Volume 15, Issue 1, 2019, pp. 21:1–21:19
https://lmcs.episciences.org/
Submitted Jul. 04, 2018
Published Mar. 05, 2019
ON THE INCOMPARABILITY OF CACHE ALGORITHMS IN TERMS
OF TIMING LEAKAGE
PABLO CAN˜ONES, BORIS KO¨PF, AND JAN REINEKE
IMDEA Software Institute and Universidad Polite´cnica de Madrid, Madrid, Spain
e-mail address: pablo.canones@imdea.org
IMDEA Software Institute, Madrid, Spain and Microsoft Research, Cambridge, UK
e-mail address: boris.koepf@microsoft.com
Saarland University, Saarbru¨cken, Germany
e-mail address: reineke@cs.uni-saarland.de
Abstract. Modern computer architectures rely on caches to reduce the latency gap
between the CPU and main memory. While indispensable for performance, caches pose a
serious threat to security because they leak information about memory access patterns of
programs via execution time.
In this paper, we present a novel approach for reasoning about the security of cache
algorithms with respect to timing leaks. The basis of our approach is the notion of leak
competitiveness, which compares the leakage of two cache algorithms on every possible
program. Based on this notion, we prove the following two results:
First, we show that leak competitiveness is symmetric in the cache algorithms. This
implies that no cache algorithm dominates another in terms of leakage via a program’s total
execution time. This is in contrast to performance, where it is known that such dominance
relationships exist.
Second, when restricted to caches with finite control, the leak-competitiveness relation-
ship between two cache algorithms is either asymptotically linear or constant. No other
shapes are possible.
1. Introduction
Modern computer architectures rely on caches to reduce the latency gap between the CPU
and main memory. Accessing data that is cached (a cache hit) can be hundreds of CPU
cycles faster than accessing data that needs to be fetched from main memory (a cache miss),
which translates into significant performance gains.
While caches are indispensable for performance, they pose a serious threat to security.
An attacker who can distinguish between cache hits and misses via timing measurements
can learn information about the memory access pattern of a victim’s program. This side
channel has given rise to a large number of documented attacks, e.g. [AK06, ASK07, Ber05,
GBK11, KGG+18, LSG+18, LYG+15, OST06, YF14].
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From a security point of view it would be ideal to completely eliminate cache side
channels by design, as in [TOL+11, ZWSM15]. Unfortunately, such conservative approaches
also partially void the performance benefits of caches. In practice, one usually seeks to
identify a trade-off between security and performance, which requires comparing different
cache designs in terms of their security and performance properties.
While performance analysis of cache designs is an established field [AZMM04, Dor10]
there are only few approaches concerned with analyzing their security. Examples are [HL17],
which analyzes the effect of the size of the cache and how it is shared between different agents,
and [CKR17], which measures the security of cache algorithms with respect to adversaries
who can gather information about a victim’s computation by probing the state of a shared
cache.
In this paper, we present a novel approach for evaluating the security of caches. More
precisely, we focus on the amount of information that a cache algorithm leaks to an adversary
that can measure a program’s overall execution time. Leakage through a program’s overall
execution time is practically relevant because it can be exploited remotely, and conceptually
interesting because the notions of security and performance are tightly coupled – even though
there are more powerful ways to spy on a program via shared caches [YF14].
The basis of our approach is a novel notion for comparing the leakage of cache algorithms,
which we call leak competitiveness. Leak competitiveness is inspired by competitiveness,
which is a standard notion for comparing the performance of online algorithms, and in
particular cache algorithms [RG08, ST85]. However, whereas competitive performance
analysis compares cache algorithms on individual traces, leak competitiveness compares the
leakage of cache algorithms on sets of traces, which accounts for the fact that information
flow is a hyperproperty [CS10].
The central contribution of this paper is a characterization of the possible leak-
competitiveness relationships between any two cache algorithms:
• We find that leak competitiveness is symmetric in the cache algorithms. This implies that
no cache algorithm dominates another in terms of leakage via execution time. Note that
this is in contrast to performance, where it is known that such dominance relationships
exist [RG08]. This result holds for a very general class of deterministic cache algorithms,
including fully-associative caches, set-associative caches with arbitrary replacement policies,
and even rather exotic caches such as skewed-associative caches.
• If we restrict our attention to caches with finite control, which is natural for hardware-
based cache implementations, the leak-competitiveness relationship between two cache
algorithms is either asymptotically linear in the length of the program execution or it is
constant. No other shapes are possible.
The proofs of these results are based on three intermediate steps that are of independent
interest.
(1) The first is to show that a pair of traces of memory accesses precisely characterizes the
leak competitiveness relationship between any two cache algorithms.
(2) The second step is to show that we can actually identify a single trace of memory
accesses for which the difference in number of misses between both algorithms matches
their leak competitiveness to within a factor of 2. This is surprising in the light that
leakage is a hyperproperty, i.e., it requires sets of traces to express.
(3) The third step is to define a congruence on the cache contents of algorithms with finite
control – but potentially infinite data – and to show that the resulting quotient is
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finite. Our characterization of leak competitiveness follows from the observation that, if
the trace that witnesses the leak competitiveness is large enough, it will visit multiple
congruent cache states, i.e. contain a cycle in the quotient. We then use a pumping
argument to obtain a linear lower bound on the leak competitiveness from this cycle.
Organization of the paper. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In
Section 2 we introduce a general model of deterministic cache algorithms. In Section 3 we
introduce leak competitiveness and leak ratio, based on which we present our main results
in Section 4. Sections 5–7 present the proof of our results, following the structure outlined
above. We present related work in Section 8 before we conclude in Section 9.
2. Preliminaries
Caches are fast but small memories that store a subset of the main memory’s contents to
bridge the latency gap between the CPU and the main memory. To profit from spatial
locality and to reduce management overhead, main memory is logically partitioned into a set
B of memory blocks. Each block is cached as a whole in a cache line of the same size. When
accessing a memory block, the cache logic has to determine whether the block is stored in
the cache (“cache hit”) or not (“cache miss”). In the case of a miss, the cache algorithm
decides which memory block to evict and replace by a new one.
Definition 2.1. A cache algorithm (or algorithm) is a tuple
P = (SP , iP , nP , trP , evictP ),
which consists of the following components:
• The set of control states, SP .
• The initial control state, iP ∈ SP .
• The capacity of the cache, nP ∈ N.
• The transition function, trP : SP × {0, . . . , nP − 1} → SP , that, upon a hit to one of its
nP cache lines, determines the new control state of the cache.
• The evict function, evictP : SP ×B → SP ×{0, . . . , nP −1}, that, upon a miss, determines
the new control state of the cache and the cache line to evict.
During runtime a cache configuration consists of the cache’s control state and of its
current content. The content is captured by a function c : CP = {0, . . . , nP − 1} → B ∪ {⊥}
that maps each cache line to the memory block it holds, or ⊥ if the line is invalid. A cache
configuration g = (s, c) ∈ GP = SP × CP is updated as follows upon a memory access:
updateP ((s, c), b) :=
{
(s′, c) if ∃j : c(j) = b ∧ s′ = trP (s, j),
(s′, c[j ← b]) if ∀k : c(k) 6= b ∧ (s′, j) = evictP (s, b).
(2.1)
Upon a hit, the update function is used to obtain the new control state. Upon a miss, the
accessed block replaces one of the cached blocks, determined by the evict function.
The above definition of a cache algorithm is quite general: it captures arbitrary deter-
ministic caches that operate on a bounded capacity buffer. This includes direct-mapped,
set-associative, fully-associative caches, and even skewed-associative caches with arbitrary
deterministic replacement policies. Well-known deterministic replacement policies which
fit our model are least-recently used (LRU), used in various Freescale processors such as
the MPC603E and the TriCore17xx, as well as the recent Kalray MPPA 256; pseudo-LRU
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(PLRU), a cost-efficient variant of LRU, used in the Freescale MPC750 family and multiple
Intel microarchitectures; most-recently used (MRU), also known as not most-recently used
(NMRU), another cost-efficient variant of LRU, used in the Intel Nehalem; first-in first-out
(FIFO), also known as Round Robin, used in several ARM and Freescale processors such
as the ARM922 and the Freescale MPC55xx family; Pseudo-Round Robin, used in the NXP
Coldfire 5307.
Notation: The update function is lifted to traces t ∈ B∗ of blocks recursively as follows:
updateP ((s, c), ) := (s, c),
updateP ((s, c), b ◦ t) := updateP (updateP ((s, c), b), t).
The number of misses P ((s, c), t) of an algorithm P on a trace t ∈ B∗ starting in
configuration (s, c) is determined recursively as follows:
P ((s, c), ) := 0,
P ((s, c), b ◦ t) := miss(b, c) + P (updateP (b, (s, c)), t),
where miss(b, c) = (∀j : c(j) 6= b ? 1 : 0).
We use P (t) as a shortcut for P ((iP , λj.⊥), t), i.e., the number of misses on the trace
t when starting in the initial configuration of the cache. Also, P (t, t′) is a shortcut for
P (tt′)− P (t), i.e., the number of misses on the suffix t′.
3. Leak Ratio
In this section we define a measure for comparing the security of cache algorithms, which we
call the leak ratio. The leak ratio is inspired by quantitative notions of security in information
flow analysis [KB07, Smi09] and by the notion of relative miss competitiveness [RG08] from
the real-time systems community. We revisit both notions first.
3.1. Relative Miss Competitiveness. Relative competitiveness [RG08] is a notion for
comparing the worst-case performance of two cache algorithms. It is based on the classic
notion of competitiveness [ST85], which compares an online algorithm with the optimal
offline algorithm. Below, we reproduce a slightly simplified version of the definition of
relative competitiveness from [RG08]:
Definition 3.1. For r ∈ R>0, we say that a algorithm P is r-miss-competitive relative to
algorithm Q if there exists c ∈ R>0 such that
P (t) ≤ r ·Q(t) + c,
for all traces t ∈ B∗.
Example 3.2. LRU of associativity 4 is 1-miss-competitive relative to FIFO of associativity 2.
On the other hand, FIFO of associativity 2 is not r-miss-competitive to LRU of associativity
4 for any r. Therefore, LRU of associativity 4 outperforms FIFO of associativity 2 in number
of misses. See [RG08] for details and more examples.
3.2. Leak Competitiveness. We next introduce a notion based on relative competitiveness
that compares the amount of information that two cache algorithms leak via their timing
behavior. We begin by recalling basic concepts from quantitative information-flow analysis.
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3.2.1. Quantifying Leaks. As is common in side-channel analysis based on quantitative
information-flow [KB07], we quantify the amount of information a system leaks in terms
of the number of observations an adversary can make. This number represents an upper
bound on entropy loss, for different notions of entropy including Shannon entropy, min-
entropy [Smi09], or g-vulnerability [ACPS12]. Each of those notions of entropy is associated
with an interpretation in terms of security. For example, using min-entropy as a basis for
the interpretation, a bound on the number of observations corresponds to an upper bound
on the factor by which guessing becomes easier through side-channel information.
For formalizing a program’s leakage through cache timing effects, we abstract the
program in terms of the set T of traces of memory accesses it can perform. We always
consider traces of finite length l, hence T ⊆ Bl. We capture the attacker’s observation of a
program execution as the number of cache misses produced by the corresponding trace. If l
is known to the adversary, then she can deduce the number of misses from the program’s
overall execution time, due to the large latency gap between cache hits and cache misses1.
The information the program leaks through timing is hence captured by P (T ) ⊆ N, the
image of T under P , and quantified by |P (T )| ∈ N.
3.2.2. Comparing Leaks. Notions of performance such as relative competitiveness (see Defi-
nition 3.1) are based on trace properties, hence the point of comparison are individual traces.
In contrast, information-theoretic notions of leakage are hyperproperties, which makes sets
of traces the natural point of comparison. We now define leak competitiveness, a concept
that enables us to compare the timing leakage of two cache algorithms, and that is based on
lifting miss competitiveness from traces to sets of traces.
Definition 3.3. For a function r : N→ R≥0, we say that algorithm P is r-leak-competitive
relative to algorithm Q if, for all l ∈ N,
|P (T )| ≤ r(l) · |Q(T )| ,
for all set of traces of blocks T ⊆ Bl.
Even though the definition of leak competitiveness is based on a lifting of miss compet-
itiveness, there are important differences. Most importantly, leak competitiveness of two
algorithms P,Q bounds the ratio of leakage for each l ∈ N, whereas miss competitiveness
bounds the ratio of hits and misses for all l. For traces of length l and an empty initial cache,
the number of misses any cache algorithm can produce is in {1, . . . , l}, which means that
any two algorithms are r-leak-competitive for r(l) = l. The question is hence not whether
two cache algorithms are leak-competitive, but rather what shape this relationship takes.
We introduce the leak ratio to facilitate reasoning about this shape.
Definition 3.4. Given a pair of algorithms P and Q we define the leak ratio rP,Q as:
rP,Q(l) = min{r(l) | r : N→ R≥0, P is r-leak-competitive relative to Q}.
As we are mostly interested in the asymptotic behavior of rP,Q, the lack of an additive
slack in the definition of miss competitiveness is not essential.
1We consider “noiseless” attacks where the attacker is able to obtain the maximum amount of information
from the cache. This assumption is common in the literature on security to safely over-approximate the
security for real life attacks.
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4. Characterizing the Leak Ratio
In this section we present our main result, which is a characterization of the asymptotic
behavior of the leak ratio for any pair of cache algorithms. We then give interpretations
of this behavior in terms of security. We present the proofs of the technical results in
Sections 5-7.
4.1. Non-Dominance. The key question motivating our work is whether some cache
algorithms are preferable to others in terms of their leakage via timing. This is a natural
question to ask because it is well-known that such preferences relations exist for performance,
see Example 3.2. The following theorem gives a negative answer to the question above.
Theorem 4.1. For each pair of algorithms P,Q we have, as l grows:
O(rP,Q(l)) = O(rQ,P (l)).
Theorem 4.1 shows that cache algorithms are incomparable in the sense that, for every
l ∈ N and every set of traces T that witnesses an advantage for P over Q in terms of leakage,
there is a set of traces T ′ that witnesses a comparable advantage of Q over P . The following
examples exhibits such witnesses for P = LRU and Q = FIFO.
Example 4.2. Consider two fully-associative caches of capacity two, one with LRU and
the other with FIFO replacement, and the following sets of traces:
T =

ABACACBBB,
ABACDAAAA,
ABACBADDD,
ABACBACBB,
ABACBACBA

T ′ =

ABACBAAAA,
ABACDAAAA,
ABACABCCC,
ABACACBCA

Starting from an empty initial cache state, LRU produces 5 different observations on T ,
whereas FIFO produces only one. In contrast, FIFO produces 4 different observations on T ′
whereas LRU produces only one.
The root cause for this divergent behavior is that, after accessing the prefix ABAC,
the content of both caches differs: block C evicts the least recently used block for LRU
(i.e., B) but the first block to enter the cache for FIFO (i.e., A). The suffixes of the traces are
constructed in such a way that the difference in cache content maps to different observable
behavior. The full diagram of updates of the cache when using these sets of traces is given
in Figure 2 in the Appendix.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is based on a systematic way of constructing sets of traces
such as the ones in Example 4.2. Formally, the theorem follows from applying Theorem 6.3,
introduced in Section 6, to P,Q and to Q,P . Moreover, we will see later that these sets can
be obtained from only two traces of memory blocks and that those two traces are enough to
characterize the leak ratio.
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4.2. Shapes of rP,Q. In Section 3 we have already observed that the leak ratio rP,Q between
any two algorithms P and Q is upper bounded by a linear function. The interesting
question is hence what sublinear shapes rP,Q can take. We answer this question for cache
algorithms with finite sets of control states, which encompasses most hardware-based cache
implementations. For this important class, the following theorem shows that the leak ratio
is either asymptotically constant or linear, ruling out any nontrivial sublinear shape.
Theorem 4.3. For each pair of algorithms P,Q with finite control we have either
• rP,Q(l) ∈ Θ(l), or
• rP,Q(l) ∈ Θ(1).
These results are a direct consequence of Theorem 7.4, introduced in Section 7, which
shows that the leak ratio of two finite-control algorithms P,Q is lower bounded by a linear
factor if and only if there exist traces that witness that the difference in misses between
P and Q is unbounded. Whether such traces exist determines in which of the two classes
described by Theorem 4.3 the algorithms P and Q fall. If they do not exist, note that
Corollary 6.2 implies that rP,Q ∈ O(1).
For example, any pair of algorithms with different capacities falls into the first class.
This is because one algorithm always contains a block that the other does not, which allows
to construct a trace of unbounded difference in misses.
Together with Theorem 4.1, Theorem 4.3 leads to a stronger non-dominance result for
finite-control algorithms, namely that for every l ∈ N there are sets of traces T lP , T lQ ⊆ Bl
such that one algorithm asymptotically leaks the largest possible amount of information
whereas the other leaks almost nothing. That is, P (T lP ) ∈ Θ(1) and Q(T lP ) ∈ Θ(l), whereas
P (T lQ) ∈ Θ(l) and Q(T lQ) ∈ Θ(1).
The non-dominance results from Theorems 4.1 and 4.3 also show why we cannot define
leak competitiveness in the same way as miss-competitiveness, that is, where each pair of
cache algorithms has a constant leak ratio for all lengths of traces. Except for the case where
both leak ratios are in Θ(1), if we can find, for each length, sets of traces where one cache
algorithm leaks more and more information as we increase the length whereas the other leaks
a constant amount, no constant value of the leak ratio satisfies the leak-competitiveness
definition for all lengths.
We now compute the leak ratio functions for two pairs of cache algorithms to showcase
how the constants ignored in the asymptotic results in Theorems 4.1 and 4.3 can mean a
small advantage of one cache algorithm over the other, provided the leak ratios are not in
Θ(1).
Example 4.4. We can compute the leak ratios for small lengths of traces by computing
all traces of hits and misses of a given length and then choosing the subset of traces that
produces the largest ratio in the number of observations in favor of each algorithm.
To compute these traces of hits and misses we simulate them by exhaustively enumerating
all possible traces of memory blocks Bl. We now argue the size of the set B needed for
the case of capacity two. For every pair of configurations updated from the initial by the
same trace of memory blocks, the last accessed block is cached (2.1), accessing this block
again produces a hit for both configurations. The other line of the configuration may store
a different memory block for each cache algorithm so that accessing one of them produces a
hit for one algorithm and a miss for the other and vice versa. Finally, accessing any memory
block not cached for any of the cache algorithms produces a miss for both. Then, for cache
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(a) Comparison of the leak ratios of LRU relative
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(b) Comparison of the leak ratios of LRU relative
to (F)LRU and vice versa.
Figure 1. Example of the behavior of the leak ratios of the cache algorithms
from Example 4.4. Figure 1A shows two leak ratios that grow asymptotically
linearly and where the slopes can give a slight advantage of one algorithm
over the other. Figure 1A shows two leak ratios that eventually become
constant functions and were, for large lengths of traces, there is no advantage
of one algorithm over the other.
algorithms with capacity two, four memory blocks are enough to simulate all possible traces
of hits and misses.
Consider two pairs of fully-associative caches of capacity two, one pair considers replace-
ments LRU and FIFO while the other considers LRU and a cache algorithm that we denote
(F)LRU that starts behaving like FIFO but, after seven accesses to memory, behaves like
LRU for the remaining of the accesses. The leak ratios for LRU and FIFO are shown in
Figure 1A and the ones for LRU and (F)LRU are shown in Figure 1B.
We see that the leak ratios of LRU and FIFO exemplify the first case of Theorem 4.3
and that, by looking at the slopes, that the asymptotic approach ignores, we conclude that
FIFO has a small advantage over LRU since the leak ratio of FIFO relative to LRU grows
slower than that of LRU relative to FIFO, Figure 1A.
On the other hand, the leak ratios of LRU and (F)LRU exemplify the second case of
Theorem 4.3. The leak ratios for both cache algorithms start growing at different rates
but, once both algorithms behave like LRU the leak ratios end up coinciding and become
constant functions. Although both cache algorithms behave the same starting from length
eight, not all pairs of configurations contain the same memory blocks at this point, which
still allows for both leak ratios to grow with the length. Once all traces update the pairs
of configurations to having the same blocks for both algorithms, the leak ratios become
constant functions.
A pair of cache algorithms that are the same or eventually become the same are the
only ones that verify the second case of Theorem 4.3. This is because the leak ratios grow
when the pairs of configurations do not have the same memory blocks cached and the access
to a specific memory block produces a hit for one algorithm and a miss for the other. If, at
some point, every access to a memory block has the same effect for both algorithms, the
leak ratios do not grow anymore.
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By using a constant notion of leak competitiveness, all cache algorithms, except for the
ones in Θ(1), would be deemed incomparable. On the other hand, by defining the leak ratios
as functions of the length of the trace and observing the growth rate as in Example 4.4, we
can establish a comparison between cache algorithms.
4.3. Discussion. We now discuss the implications of Theorems 4.1 and 4.3 (short: our
results) in practice.
(1) Our results are asymptotic in nature. The constants hidden behind the O-notation can
indicate a (gradual) preference between algorithms on finite sets of traces. E.g., the
traces in Example 4.2 and the different slopes on Example 4.4 show a slight advantage
of FIFO over LRU.
(2) Our results rely on the construction of sets of traces that witness advantages of one
cache algorithm over another, see Example 4.2. However, the constructed traces need
not correspond to a program of interest. Restricting to a specific class of programs
corresponds to the constraint that witnesses be picked from a subset T ⊆ Bl instead
of Bl. Under such constraints, it may be possible that a preference relation between
cache algorithms exists.
(3) Our results rely on the assumptions that the caching algorithm is deterministic and
based on demand paging, i.e., it loads blocks only when they are requested by the
program. It is possible that randomized policies or features such as prefetching enable
one to sidestep our results. For example, for miss-competitiveness it is known that
randomized policies [FKL+91] achieve better bounds than those possible for deterministic
policies [ST85]. The study of leak competitiveness for randomized cache algorithms is
out of the scope of this paper. We are aware of non-dominance results for a similar
notion of leak-competitiveness that consider the RANDOM cache algorithm that, upon
a miss, evicts a memory block randomly [Sch18].
(4) Our results rely on an adversary that can observe the overall execution time of the
program as in, e.g. [Ber05, OST06]. They do not necessarily hold for adversaries that
can observe the cache state after or during the computation of the victim. Such attacks
are possible whenever the adversary shares the cache with the victim, which has shown
to be the most effective attack vector. In contrast, our results are relevant for remote
attacks, which are less effective, but harder to detect and defend against. We briefly
discuss the case of access-based adversaries in Section 8.
Despite these limitations in scope, we do believe that our results lay an interesting basis for
theory research in the domain of microarchitectural side-channel attacks, where foundational
results are still scarce.
5. Leak Ratio from a Pair of Traces
Information leakage is a hyperproperty, i.e., a property of sets of traces. We now show that
the leak can always be expressed in terms of the difference in observations of only two traces
of memory blocks.
For an algorithm Q and l ∈ N, we say that t1, t2 ∈ Bl are Q-equivalent whenever
Q(t1) = Q(t2). We say that a set T ⊆ Bl is Q-dense if the image of T under Q is a
contiguous sequence of natural numbers, i.e. Q(T ) = {j, j + 1, . . . , j + k} for some j, k ∈ N.
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Proposition 5.1. For all pairs of algorithms P and Q, all lengths l, and all pairs of
Q-equivalent traces of memory blocks t1, t2 ∈ Bl:
P (t2)− P (t1) ≤ rP,Q(l)− 1. (5.1)
Moreover, there exist pairs of traces of Q-equivalent memory blocks t1, t2 ∈ Bl such that (5.1)
is an equality.
That is, every pair of traces that coincides in timing observation on one algorithm
cannot differ by more than the leak ratio on the other algorithm. Moreover, there exists a
pair of traces that matches this bound.
The proof of the upper bound is based on constructing a set T ⊆ Bl of Q-equivalent
traces from a pair t, t′ ∈ Bl of Q-equivalent traces. The set T is P -dense with maximum
P (t′) and minimum P (t). It satisfies
rP,Q(l) ≥ |P (T )||Q(T )| , (5.2)
which equals P (t)− P (t′) + 1 by construction.
The following lemma describes the construction of traces Q-equivalent to t and t′ whose
number of misses for P cover every value in between P (t) and P (t′). The set T is composed
of these traces.
Lemma 5.2. Consider two Q-equivalent traces t, t′ ∈ Bl with P (t) ≤ P (t′). Then, for every
P (t) ≤ k ≤ P (t′) there exists a trace t∗ ∈ Bl such that P (t∗) = k and that is Q-equivalent
to t and t′.
Proof. We begin with a continuity argument to identify a prefix of the trace t, which we later
extend to t∗. For this, note that the difference in misses, Q− P , between both algorithms
on trace t is initially zero, i.e. Q()− P () = 0, and increases or decreases by at most 1 per
added block, until it reaches Q(t)− P (t). We first consider the case Q(t) ≥ P (t). For any k
with 0 ≤ Q(t)− k ≤ Q(t)− P (t), we hence find a prefix b1 · · · bu of t such that the value of
Q− P on the prefix is exactly Q(t)− k:
Q(b1 · · · bu)− P (b1 · · · bu) = Q(t)− k. (5.3)
We create a trace t∗ with prefix b∗1 . . . b∗u = b1 . . . bu, which we extend by blocks b∗u+1 . . . b∗v
that produce misses on both P and Q until
Q(b∗1 . . . b
∗
v) = Q(t) . (5.4)
For the blocks b∗u+1 . . . b∗v to miss they must be uncached in both P and Q; such blocks
can be found whenever B is larger than the sum of the the capacities of both algorithms.
We further extend b∗1 . . . b∗v with l − v copies of b∗v to the trace t∗ of length l. Repeatedly
accessing b∗v is guaranteed to produce hits on both P and Q.
As the blocks b∗u+1 . . . b∗l produce identical outputs on P and Q, the trace t
∗ still
satisfies (5.3), i.e.,
Q(t∗)− P (t∗) = Q(t)− k .
Moreover, t∗ also still satisfies (5.4), i.e., Q(t∗) = Q(t), from which we conclude that t∗ is
Q-equivalent to t and P (t∗) = k. Note that we only handled the case P (t) ≤ Q(t) so that
k ≤ Q(t). The case P (t) > Q(t) where k > Q(t) proceeds in the same way but extending a
prefix of t′ instead of t and reformulating (5.3) to P (b′1 · · · b′u)−Q(b′1 · · · b′u) = k−Q(t′).
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Example 5.3. Consider the cache algorithms P = LRU and Q = FIFO and the traces
of memory blocks ABACACBBB and ABACBACBA, as in Example 4.2. Both traces are
FIFO-equivalent, however LRU(ABACACBBB) = 4 and LRU(ABACBACBA) = 8. Then,
following Lemma 5.2, there exist three traces of memory blocks that are FIFO-equivalent
but where LRU produces between 5 and 7 misses, namely:
{ABACDAAAA,ABACBADDD,ABACBACBB}
The union of this set with the two initial traces yields the set T from Example 4.2.
The proof of the tightness of the upper bound in Proposition 5.1 follows from the fact
that every set T that satisfies equality in (5.2) contains within it a subset T ∗ of Q-equivalent
traces that also satisfies equality in (5.2). We show that this set T ∗ is P -dense, which means
that the elements t, t′ ∈ T ∗ that produce the maximal difference in misses under P satisfy
P (t)− P (t′) = rP,Q − 1.
The following lemma shows how to find such a T ∗.
Lemma 5.4. Every set T ⊆ Bl that satisfies equality in (5.2) contains a P -dense subset of
Q-equivalent traces that also satisfies equality in (5.2).
Proof. We partition T = T1 unionmulti · · · unionmulti Tk, into classes of Q-equivalent traces. Without loss of
generality assume that P (T1) ≥ P (Tj), for j > 1. Then we have:
|P (T )|
|Q(T )| ≤
∑k
j=1 |P (Tj)|∑k
j=1 |Q(Tj)|
=
∑k
j=1 |P (Tj)|∑k
j=1 1
(∗)
≤ |P (T1)| ,
where (∗) follows from the fact that, for any sequence of natural numbers a1, . . . , ak,∑k
j=1 aj ≤ kmax(a1, . . . , ak). As a consequence, T1 also satisfies |P (T1)| = rP,Q(l). More-
over, P (T1) is a contiguous set of natural numbers. If it were not, we could apply Lemma 5.2
to augment T1 by a trace that produces the missing number of observations, contradicting
that rP,Q is an upper bound.
6. Approximation of the Leak Ratio from a Single Trace
In Section 5 we have seen that the leak ratio of two cache algorithms, which is defined as a
property of arbitrary sets of traces, is fully characterized by a pair of traces. In this section,
we show that the leak ratio can be approximated to within a factor of 2 using a single trace.
Lemma 6.1. Let t ∈ Bl be an arbitrary trace. Then, there is a trace t′ ∈ Bl with
P (t′) = Q(t′) = Q(t).
Proof. We construct the trace t′ ∈ Bl as the concatenation of two subtraces t′miss and t′hit:
t′miss is a trace of length Q(t) in which all accesses are chosen such that they result in misses
in both P and Q. This is always possible, as there are at most nP + nQ blocks cached in P
and Q at any time and accesses to any other block will result in a miss. Let b ∈ B be the
final access in t′miss. Independently of the cache algorithm, b must be cached in both P and
Q following t′miss. The second subtrace t
′
hit then simply consists of |t| −Q(t) accesses to b,
which will result in hits in both P and Q.
The following corollary of the previous lemma and of Proposition 5.1 shows that the
leakage ratio is “almost” a trace property, as it can be approximated to within a factor of
two based on the number of misses of P and Q on a single trace:
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Corollary 6.2. For all pairs of cache algorithms P and Q, all lengths l, and all traces of
memory blocks t ∈ Bl:
|P (t)−Q(t)| ≤ rP,Q(l)− 1. (6.1)
Moreover, there exists a trace t ∈ Bl such that:
rP,Q(l)− 1
2
≤ |P (t)−Q(t)|.
Proof. Let t ∈ Bl be an arbitrary trace. By Lemma 6.1, there is a trace t′ such that
P (t′) = Q(t′) = Q(t). So t and t′ are Q-equivalent. Thus, by Proposition 5.1, we have both
P (t)− P (t′) ≤ rP,Q(l)− 1 and P (t′)− P (t) ≤ rP,Q(l)− 1,
which implies that |P (t)−Q(t)| = |P (t)− P (t′)| ≤ rP,Q(l)− 1.
By Proposition 5.1, there is a pair of Q-equivalent traces t1, t2 ∈ Bl such that:
P (t2)− P (t1) = rP,Q(l)− 1.
Let q = Q(t1) = Q(t2). Either 2·|P (t2)−q| ≥ P (t2)− P (t1) or 2·|P (t1)−q| ≥ P (t2)− P (t1),
where equality is achieved on one of the two inequalities if q is centered between P (t1) and
P (t2). Assume that 2 · |P (t2) − q| ≥ P (t2)− P (t1). Then |P (t2) − Q(t2)| ≥ P (t2)−P (t1)2 =
rP,Q−1
2 . Otherwise, |P (t1)−Q(t1)| ≥ P (t2)−P (t1)2 =
rP,Q−1
2 .
Theorem 6.3. For all pairs of cache algorithms P and Q and all lengths l:
rP,Q(l) ≤ 2 · rQ,P (l)− 1
Proof. By Corollary 6.2, there is a trace t ∈ Bl, such that
rQ,P (l)− 1
2
≤ |Q(t)− P (t)| = |P (t)−Q(t)| ≤ rP,Q(l)− 1.
Multiplying both sides by 2 and adding 1 finish the proof.
7. A Linear Lower Bound on the Leak Ratio
In this section, we show that if the difference in misses between two cache algorithms is
unbounded, then there are traces on which the difference in misses grows linearly in the
length of the trace. Together with the result from the previous section, this implies that the
leak ratio between two algorithms grows linearly in the length of the trace if and only if the
difference between the two algorithms is unbounded. This result does not hold for arbitrary
caches conforming to the model introduced in Section 2. We need to make two additional
assumptions:
(1) We assume the set of control states SP of a cache algorithm to be finite. This is naturally
the case for hardware-based caches that maintain a finite set of status bits to guide
future eviction decisions.
(2) We assume that the evict function, evictP : SP×B → SP×{0, . . . , nP−1} is independent
of its second parameter, i.e., evictP (s, b) = evictP (s, b
′) for all s ∈ SP and b, b′ ∈ B. This
assumption is naturally fulfilled by fully-associative caches, where there is no restriction
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on the placement of a memory block based on its address. This assumption could be
significantly weakened at the expense of a more complicated proof.2
For the proof of the result we argue that, while there is an unbounded number of different
cache configurations, even assuming an unbounded supply of memory blocks B, there are
only finitely many “non-congruent” pairs of cache configurations, where congruent will be
defined precisely below. Intuitively, congruent pairs of cache configurations behave similarly
to each other, if their cache contents are appropriately renamed.
Such a renaming can be captured by a bijection. Let pi : B → B be a bijection on
memory blocks and let pi∗ denote its extension to cache contents that maps ⊥ to ⊥:
pi∗(c) = λl.
{
pi(c(l)) : c(l) ∈ B
⊥ : c(l) = ⊥
We also lift pi to cache configurations with pi∗(s, c) = (s, pi∗(c)) and to traces with pi∗() = 
and pi∗(b ◦ t) = pi(b) ◦ pi∗(t).
Let (s, c) be an arbitrary cache configuration. Observe that:
∀t ∈ B∗ : pi∗(updateP ((s, c), t)) = updateP (pi∗(s, c), pi∗(t)), (7.1)
i.e. renamed cache configurations behave the same on renamed accesses. Also observe that:
missP (b, c) = missP (pi(b), pi
∗(c)), (7.2)
which holds because pi(b) is contained in pi∗(c) if and only if b is contained in c. From these
two observations, it follows that:
P ((s, c), t) = P (pi∗(s, c), pi(t)). (7.3)
Definition 7.1 (Congruent cache configurations). Two pairs of cache configurations (gP , gQ)
and (g′P , g
′
Q) are congruent, denoted by (gP , gQ)) ≡ (g′P , g′Q), if there is a bijection pi : B → B,
such that g′P = pi
∗(gP ) and g′Q = pi
∗(gQ). To indicate a bijection pi that is a witness to the
congruence of two pairs of cache configurations we also write (gP , gQ) ≡pi (g′P , g′Q).
Note that congruence is an equivalence relation. We denote the equivalence class of a
pair of cache configuration (gP , gQ) by
[gP , gQ] := {(g′P , g′Q) ∈ GP ×GQ | (g′P , g′Q) ≡ (gP , gQ)}.
While the set of pairs of cache configurations is infinite, its quotient w.r.t. to the
congruence relation is finite:
Theorem 7.2 (Index of ≡). Let P and Q be two finite-control-state cache algorithms. Then,
the quotient
GP ×GQ/≡ = {[gP , gQ] | (gP , gQ) ∈ GP ×GQ}
is finite.
Proof. Remember that nP and nQ denote the capacities of P and Q. Let BP,Q be an
arbitrary but fixed subset of B, such that |BP,Q| = nP + nQ.
We show below that each pair ((sP , cP ), (sQ, cQ)) of cache configurations is congruent to
a pair of cache configurations ((sP , c
′
P ), (sQ, c
′
Q)) in which only blocks from BP,Q may occur
in the cache contents c′P and c
′
Q. As BP,Q is finite, there are only finitely many different
2A weaker, yet sufficient condition would be that there is a finite partition of B, such that evictP (s, b) =
evictP (s, b
′) for all s ∈ SP and b, b′ that are in the same block of the partition. This weaker assumption is
fulfilled by arbitrary set-associative caches.
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cache contents c′P and c
′
Q containing only blocks from BP,Q. The sets of control states SP
and SQ are finite by assumption. Together, this implies that the set of equivalence classes of
≡ is finite.
Below we show how to incrementally construct a bijection pi : B → B such that the
contents of c′P = pi
∗(cP ) and c′Q = pi
∗(cQ) contain only blocks from BP,Q:
(1) Initially, let pi be the identity function on B, and let D = BP,Q.
(2) For i = 0, . . . , nP − 1:
If cP (i) ∈ BP,Q then modify D to D = D \ {cP (i)}.
(3) For j = 0, . . . , nQ − 1:
If cQ(j) ∈ BP,Q then modify D to D = D \ {cQ(j)}.
(4) For i = 0, . . . , nP − 1:
If cP (i) 6= ⊥ and pi(cP (i)) 6∈ BP,Q, then pick b ∈ D and modify pi and D as follows:
pi = pi[cP (i) 7→ b][b 7→ cP (i)] and D = D \ {b}.
(5) For j = 0, . . . , nQ − 1:
If cQ(j) 6= ⊥ and pi(cQ(j)) 6∈ BP,Q, then pick b ∈ D and modify pi and D as follows:
pi = pi[cQ(j) 7→ b][b 7→ cQ(j)] and D = D \ {b}.
Note that there is always a b ∈ D available, when the above algorithm needs one, because
the operation is applied at most |BP,Q| = nP + nQ times. Throughout its execution, the
algorithm maintains the invariant that pi is a bijection. Further, the resulting bijection
satisfies pi∗(cP ), pi∗(cQ) ⊆ BP,Q ∪ {⊥}.
We can exploit Theorem 7.2 in a manner similar to the application of the pumping
lemma for regular languages in the proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 7.3. Let P and Q be two finite-control-state cache algorithms. Further, let the
difference in misses between P and Q be unbounded, i.e.,
∀m ∈ N : ∃t ∈ B∗ : |P (t)−Q(t)| > m.
Then, there is an f ∈ R, f > 0 and an m0 ∈ N, such that
∀m ∈ N,m > m0 : ∃t ∈ Bm : |P (t)−Q(t)| > f · |t|.
Proof. Let P and Q be two finite-control-state cache algorithms such that the difference in
misses between P and Q is unbounded. Let l = |GP ×GQ/≡|+ 1, which must be finite due
to Theorem 7.2.
As the difference in misses between P and Q is unbounded, there must be a t ∈ B∗
such that |P (t)−Q(t)| = l. We will assume without loss of generality3 that P (t) > Q(t) for
such traces t, and so |P (t) − Q(t)| = P (t) − Q(t). Then, let t1, . . . , tl be prefixes of t, s.t.
P (tj)−Q(tj) = j for all 1 ≤ j ≤ l.
Let igP = (iP , λj.⊥) and igQ = (iQ, λj.⊥) be the initial configurations of P and Q. Also,
let pj = updateP (igP , tj) and qj = updateQ(igQ, tj) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ l.
Due to the pigeonhole principle, there must be at least two prefixes tj and tk, with j < k,
such that the pairs of cache configurations (pj , qj) and (pk, qk) resulting from executing these
prefixes are congruent. Assume that tj and tk are two such prefixes.
As tj is a prefix of tk, we can decompose tk into tj and tj→k, such that tk = tj◦tj→k. From
P (tj)−Q(tj) = j and P (tk)−Q(tk) = k we can conclude that P (tj , tj→k)−Q(tj , tj→k) =
(P (tk)− P (tj))− (Q(tk)−Q(tj)) = k − j ≥ 1.
3If P (t) < Q(t) the following arguments hold with P and Q exchanged.
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We can arbitrarily extend tj using the following construction of the traces τm and ωm:
τ0 = tj ,
τm+1 = τm ◦ ωm,
ω0 = tj→k,
ωm+1 = pi
∗(ωm).
Let um = updateP (igP , τm) and vm = updateQ(igQ, τm). For the following induction
proof, it will be helpful to express um+1 and vm+1 in terms of um and vm. We have that
um+1 = updateP (igP , τm ◦ ωm) = updateP (updateP (igP , τm), ωm) = updateP (um, ωm) and
similarly vm+1 = updateQ(vm, ωm).
We can show by induction that (um, vm) ≡pi (um+1, vm+1):
• (Induction base) For m = 0, τ0 = tj and τ1 = τ0 ◦ ω0 = tj ◦ tj→k = tk. Thus we
have that u0 = updateP (igP , τ0) = updateP (igP , tj) = pj and v0 = updateQ(igQ, τ0) =
updateQ(igQ, tj) = qj . Similarly, u1 = pk and v1 = qk, and we already know that
(pj , qj) ≡pi (pk, qk).
• (Induction step) For m > 0, we know from the induction hypothesis that (um−1, vm−1) ≡pi
(um, vm). Applying (7.1) with t = ωm−1 yields pi∗(um) = pi∗(updateP (um−1, ωm−1)) =
updateP (um, pi
∗(ωm−1)) = updateP (um, ωm) = um+1, and similarly pi∗(vm) = vm+1. Thus
(um, vm) ≡pi (um+1, vm+1).
Since we have that um+1 = pi(um) and vm+1 = pi(vm), applying (7.3) yields that
P (um+1, ωm+1) = P (um+1, pi
∗(ωm)) = P (um, ωm) and similarly we have P (vm+1, ωm+1) =
P (vm, ωm) for all m. In other words, the number of misses on the subtraces ωm are
always the same in both P and Q. We also know that P (u0, ω0) = P (tj , tj→k) and
Q(v0, ω0) = Q(tj , tj→k). Thus, we have
P (τm) = P (tj) +m · P (tj , tj→k),
Q(τm) = Q(tj) +m ·Q(tj , tj→k),
P (τm)−Q(τm) = P (tj)−Q(tj) +m · (P (tj , tj→k)−Q(tj , tj→k)),
= P (tj)−Q(tj) +m · (k − j).
Let f = k−j|tj→k|+1 ≥
1
|tj→k|+1 > 0. For large enough m, |P (τm)−Q(τm)| = P (tj)−Q(tj) +m ·
(k − j) is greater than f · |τm| = k−j|tj→k|+1 · (|τ0|+m · |tj→k|), which proves the theorem.
In other words, if the difference in misses between two finite-control-state algorithms is
unbounded, then it actually grows linearly in the length of the trace.
Theorem 7.4. The leak ratio between two finite-control-state cache algorithms P and Q
grows linearly in the length of the trace if and only if the difference in misses between P and
Q is unbounded:
rP,Q(l), rQ,P (l) ∈ Ω(l) ⇔ ∀m ∈ N : ∃t ∈ B∗ : |P (t)−Q(t)| > m.
Proof. Direction “⇒”: Assume for a contradiction that there is an mmax ∈ N, such that for
all traces t ∈ B∗: |P (t)−Q(t)| ≤ mmax. As rP,Q(l) ∈ Ω(l) there must be an l∗, such that
rP,Q(l
∗) > 2 ·mmax + 1. By the second part of Corollary 6.2, there is a trace t such that
mmax <
rP,Q(l
∗)− 1
2
≤ |P (t)−Q(t)|,
21:16 Pablo Can˜ones, Boris Ko¨pf, and Jan Reineke Vol. 15:1
which contradicts our assumption.
Direction “⇐”: We will prove that rP,Q(l) ∈ Ω(l). The fact that rQ,P (l) ∈ Ω(l) follows
by simply exchanging P and Q because |P (t)−Q(t)| = |Q(t)− P (t)|.
To prove that rP,Q(l) ∈ Ω(l), we have to show that there is a k > 0 and an m0 ∈ N,
such that ∀m ∈ N,m > m0 : rP,Q(m) ≥ k ·m.
By Theorem 7.3, we can conclude that there is an f > 0 and an m′0 ∈ N, such that
∀m ∈ N,m > m′0 : ∃t ∈ Bm : |P (t) −Q(t)| > f · |t|. Pick k to be f and m0 to be m′0. To
prove the theorem it then remains to show that ∃t ∈ Bm : |P (t) − Q(t)| > f · |t| implies
rP,Q(m) > f ·m.
To this end, let t ∈ Bm be a trace that satisfies |P (t) − Q(t)| > f · |t|. Applying the
first part of Corollary 6.2 yields f · |t| < |P (t)−Q(t)| < rP,Q(m).
8. Related Work
Leak competitiveness is inspired by work on competitive performance analysis. The notion
of competitive analysis was first introduced in [ST85], where the authors bound the number
of misses an online algorithm does on a trace of memory blocks in terms of the number of
misses of an optimal offline algorithm [Bel66]. In contrast to performance, there is no clear
candidate for an optimal offline cache algorithm for security, because the best option would
be not to cache memory blocks and be trivially non-interferent. This is why we base leak
competitiveness on relative competitiveness [RG08]. Here, the number of misses one cache
algorithm produces is compared with the number of misses of another algorithm, none of
them necessarily optimal.
The notion of leakage we use is based on concepts from quantitative information-flow
analysis [CHM07, ACPS12, Smi09]. They have been successfully used for detecting and
quantifying side channels of program code [DKMR15, HM10, KB07, NMS09].
Concepts from quantitative information-flow analysis have been applied to the analysis
of cache algorithms [CKR17]. Our work goes beyond this in two crucial aspects. First,
we consider adversaries that measure overall execution time of a victim, whereas [CKR17]
consider so-called access-based adversaries that gain information by probing the state of a
shared cache after the victim’s computation terminates. Second, our analysis is based on
a comparison of cache algorithms on each program, whereas [CKR17] identifies the worst
possible program for each.
We can, however, interpret some of the results of [CKR17] in terms of leak-competitiveness
w.r.t. to an access-based adversary. The bound that governs leakage in this scenario is not
the length of the trace but rather the number of memory blocks used by (i.e. the footprint
of) the victim program. With this, one can read Propositions 6 and 7 of [CKR17] as follows:
• for FIFO and LRU, the number of observations of an access-based adversary is bounded
by a constant. This implies that the leak ratios of FIFO relative to LRU, and of LRU
relative to FIFO, are in O(1);
• for PLRU, the number of observations grows at least linearly with the footprint. This
implies that the leak ratio of PLRU relative to FIFO and LRU, respectively, is in Ω(n),
whereas the leak ratio of FIFO and LRU relative to PLRU is in O(1).
Overall, these examples show that, unlike for time based adversaries, there are dominance
relations for the security of cache algorithms with respect to access-based adversaries. We
leave a detailed investigation of this case to future work.
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Finally, a line of work focuses on secure cache architectures [HL17, ZL14]. They consider
different architectures, either introducing some sort of partition on the cache or randomness
in the replacement of memory blocks, and study their resilience against different kinds of
cache side-channel attacks.
When it comes to timing attacks, they mention that, introducing some sort of randomness
is the only way to reduce the vulnerability to leak information in this cases. This is because
with deterministic cache algorithms, the attacker knows that the observation he obtains only
depends on the victim’s accesses to memory. Our work acknowledges that this dependence
is unavoidable for deterministic cache algorithms but tries to quantify how specific cache
algorithms make the dependance less dangerous.
9. Conclusions
We presented a novel approach to compare cache algorithms in terms of their vulnerability
to side-channel attacks. Our core insight is that for leakage, as opposed to performance,
there is no dominance relationship between any two cache algorithms, in the sense that one
algorithm would outperform the other on all programs.
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